Draft Resolution 1.1

Topic: *Houthi Attacks in the Red Sea*

The North Atlantic Council

Reminding all member states that NATO has advanced and enforced peace and harmony inside and outside its borders,

Reaffirming the importance of fostering peace rather than conflict in the process of resolving international disputes,

Recalling Resolution 2722 approved by the UN Security Council, calling for an immediate end to the illegal Houthis attacks,

Deeply conscious that the attacks have resulted in the destabilization of International and the Middle Eastern order, international trade routes, and global telecommunications,

Noting with concern the destabilizing actions taken by third states, including supporting the Houthis actions, which continue to undermine peace, security, and stability of the Red Sea,

Considering that countries with smaller economies might be disproportionately affected by the attacks, therefore requiring special consideration,

Emphasizing all NATO operations and all NATO members' obligation to respect international law, particularly humanitarian and human rights laws,

Declaring that any NATO response can only be justified within the strict conditions of acting in self-defense and *only* self-defense, referencing Article 51,

Acknowledging that any military intervention beyond the scope of self-defense can exacerbate tensions in the area and have a counterproductive effect,

Recognizing the attacks being linked with other past and ongoing regional conflicts in the Middle East,

Recognizing that all capable NATO members should commit themselves to an immediate reparation of the cable, enhancing its security through technological means,

Encouraging all member states to exchange their intelligence means, close cooperation fosters more efficient and coordinated approaches to the solution of the issue at hand.

Recognizing that the humanitarian crisis in Yemen, and the halt in the UN Humanitarian Response Plan efforts following a decrease in funding mainly from NATO allied countries, act as destabilizing the Red Sea region, fuels Houthi aggression, and hence is a security risk to NATO interests.

1. ***Extends*** the undersea infrastructure protection measure of "Critical Undersea Infrastructure Coordination Cell" (referencing the agreement following the 2023 Vilnius Summit) as the relevant framework for engaging civilians and private actors, to be extended to the Red Sea area. This coordination effort is designed to map risks and coordinate efforts between Allies, partner countries, civil society, and national industries. Adapting to the regional context, consultation with the Gulf Cooperation Council is beneficial to maintaining a trust-building discussion,

2. ***Acknowledges*** the difficult diplomatic relations with the Houthi, NATO is committed to the involvement of regional actors willing to cooperate by settling special envoys with a triple scope of intelligence, risk assessment, and possibly negotiation,

3. ***Calls for*** a comprehensive effort to enhance technological innovation of undersea cables concerning:

   3.1 Physical and Technological Enhancement

   a. The physical and security of the cables are carried through the use of extra-concrete, cable armoring, and burial in depth.
   b. The cyber security of the cables by ensuring that the transmission of data is encrypted, through the establishment of a Joint Cyber Incidents Response Team,

and through the deployment of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) to monitor network traffic, to uncover potential intrusion or unusual activity.

c. The efficiency of sensors through fiber optic cables to sense objects being dropped close to the infrastructure and thus enhance the surveillance and prevention from any sabotage attempts,

3.2 Such efforts are led by the following experts: Luxembourg, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Spain, and The Netherlands,

4. ***Limits*** the nature of Preventive Collective Defense exclusively to cybernetic virtual attacks aimed at disabling Houthian capacities, with no direct physical strikes of any kind,

5. ***Considers*** that should the prior measure not be enough to neutralize the Houthian threat, other solutions are to be searched for through other means, including possibly the Special Envoys,

6. ***Calls for*** the creation of a Joint Naval Task Force and Airborne, in order to defend the submarine cables in the Red Sea and trading corridor. This task force will be composed of
    a. Danish anti-missiles brigades
    b. French SSNs submarines, nuclear powered focused on surveillance and deterrence, Destroyers and Frigates
    c. Greek Hessen (F 221) n.1
    d. German Baden-Württemberg-class fregat, n.2
    e. Italian Destroyers with S.A.M (Surface-to-Air Missiles) capabilities short to, medium-range
    f. Norwegian n.2 frigates (Fridtjof Nansen class), n.2 corvettes (Skjold), n.2 submarines (Ula class), n.3 patrol vessels (Svalbard class)
    g. Polish Intelligence of Electromagnetic Origin (type ORP Nawigator) n.1, Air Defence S-125 (Neva) n.1
    h. Portugal n.2 of ships from the Marinha Portuguesa
    i. UK Royal Navy Vanguard-class Submarines, Type 23 Duke-class Frigates, and Type 45 Daring-class Destroyers.
    j. US Aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) already present in the region, Oliver Hazard Perry-class FF Frigate
    k. Belgium intelligence sharing information and supporting strategic tasks.
    l. Romania can contribute to the Joint Naval Task Force and Airborne initiative designed to defend submarine cables in the Red Sea and trading corridors,

7. ***Commits*** to summon again the NATO Council on the occasion of the desire of one of the NATO members to modify the nature of the interventions of the Joint Naval and Airborne Force from limited preventive cybernetic defense and deterrence to a full-fledged direct

military action, involving fire weapons and missiles, voting the modification to the Resolution, which shall be passed if unanimity is again reached,

8. ***Approves*** the Joint Intelligence and Surveillance Task
    a. Satellite intelligence with ground-based intelligence sources such as human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) allow for a more comprehensive picture of Houthi's capabilities and intentions;
    b. The efforts of satellite operators, military intelligence agencies, and diplomatic channels must be coordinated to gather and analyze intelligence effectively;
    c. Use of MQ-9 reaper drone with an aerial surveillance scope,

9. ***Commits*** to ensuring that NATO operations limit the negative consequences on civilians and civilian societies, ensuring any needed military action is targeted, proportional, and self-defensive in nature,

10. ***Affirms*** its intention to enable long-term stability and peace in the Region, and confirms that NATO presence in the Region is aimed at the benefit of international order, including the benefit of actors outside of the NATO allies,

11. ***Calls for*** all states and actors in the Region to avoid the use of force, and negative externalities on civil communities.